Reports | 25 05 2020
By: Khawla Ghazi
All those working in Syrian affairs—whether stationed on the ground, or holding their papers and pencils, waiting to negotiate—are able to substantiate the correctness of their opinion, and the failure of the other party. This is largely true, due to the fact that endings remain open to all possibilities, with no “maybes.”
If one were to revert to the Syrian Revolution’s first year, one would find one single rhetoric: No negotiation with the regime, no dialogue before the departure of Assad and his entourage. Demonstrations took place in the Friday dubbed by the Syrian Revolution Facebook page "No To Dialogue,” with the star of demonstrations at the time being the city of Hama.
But has anyone paused to ask, why the opposition’s rhetoric was strong, especially in the media; and with the international mood was more to its side than it has become now?
No media pundit following events can help but notice the power and influence of the Qatari hegemony over the opposition’s decision during the era of the two “Hamads.” during their era, the Arab League opened its doors time and again for discussions, during which punitive measures against the Syrian regime were adopted. Several conferences of the Friends of the Syrian People were held, as well as the Geneva Conference, which remained in neutral gear—due to to disagreement over the role of the Syrian president. The National Council, and later the National Coalition, were founded, with the head of the latter assuming Syria’s seat in the Arab Summit Conference held in Doha in 2013. Only a few months afterwards, the golden era of the Syrian opposition’s strength fizzled, after Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani bestowed the reins of power onto his son Tamim. Along his side, his skilful and wily foreign minister Hamad bin Jabr al-Thani also exited. The opposition was afterwards forced into the shady corridors of second row men, who used to receive their orders from both “Hamads.”
Qatar eventually exited altogether, abandoning its role as official sponsor to become a mere patron and financier to ransom those kidnapped by al-Nusra Front [NF] in the Qalamun Mountains via its uninterrupted channel with Hezbollah.
One may note that, since 2013 to date, this year seems to represent the weakest showing of the “political” Syrian opposition, fragmented in its affiliation to either Saudi Arabia, Qatar or Turkey. The high ceiling of Saudi rhetoric as expressed by its administration notwithstanding; it has done nothing of substance to resolve the political conflict, except to increase military supplies to groups affiliated to it. This is also attributable to the robust and intransigent role the Russian player has played vis-a-vis the to the survival of the state and the preservation of its institutions—most importantly, the military.
The opposition’s political weakness is reflected on the ground in the control of armed brigades and Daesh over large parts of Syria; as well as its media message, coming out of Qatari tutelage, being rather brusque and unsophisticated. Its main message: "Syria is under threat of two jihads."
That, despite of numerous attempts to embellish reality and gloss over it, via the presentation of specific military authorities to the exclusion of others, as alone belonging the the Free Syrian Army [FSA]; whose idea has been eliminated, alongside many of its brigades by virtue of the ideologized financial support from the Gulf.
The standards of the Syrian Revolution disappeared, forcing the Syrian opposition to stand in front of a scene of black flags and expiatory rhetoric—not only of other sects, but also for all secular ideology. Secularism, thus, became a crime whose adherents deserve to be slaughtered.
In light of this confusion in the surreal Syrian scene, the opposition’s message was fragmented and disunited.
The advent of opposition groups amenable to dialogue with the regime—within conditions agreed upon internationally, with the aim of Syria’s salvation—was only natural. By contrast, those opposition groups affiliated to the Saudi Arabia-Turkey-Qatar line, persisted in its insistence on “no dialogue” before Assad’s departure; that is, until the American-Russian entente regarding the peaceful solution of the Syrian conflict.
This prompted Saudi Arabia to adopt a similar position in its call upon the opposition to hold a conference, and form an opposition delegation. We would find many names that were radically opposed to any form of dialogue, racing to enter the opposition’s negotiating team with the regime; and—in a scene only produced in Bollywood films—the delegation being headed by the former regime prime minister, now negotiating with his erstwhile employer!
The opposition, after circa three years from the date of the Geneva I conference, thus found themselves returning thereto; agreeing on a transitional government and presidential elections later. All those years were, therefore, lost, with Syrians finding themselves completely denuded, facing the bitter reality: Their own decision over their fate has never been a purely Syrian one; that all states have played with them; that all they had reaped were destroyed cities, a divided people split between their daily bread and the search for a safe place under a calmer sky—in which there are no fighter jets or cannons.
This year may carry significant breakthroughs in the Syrian scene, in terms of dividing the cake. But, have the Syrian people come out for this dramatic end for both land and man?
These are questions that will find no one to answer, given the current fragmentation, discord, and partisanship for various countries and groups
* Opinion pieces do not necessarily express the views of Rozana Media.