Reports | 25 05 2020
By: Ali Melhem
Barely three weeks passed following the violent blow that the assassination of martyr Naji Al-Jarf—one of the foremost activists and trainers of budding media cadres in the “liberated” areas—signalled to Syrian media affiliated with the forces of the Revolution and the opposition; as well as the precedent of the assassinations of the “Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently” campaign; that the attempts to silence these voices returned in these areas. These attempts were reflected in the detention of two prominent activists, journalists Raed al-Fares and Hadi al-Abdallah from the Radio Fresh-FM headquarters in the city of Kafranbel by a band of masked men. The differences in the places of liquidation or arrest, as well as the difference in the offending parties between Daesh, al-Nusra Front [NF], or others notwithstanding; the implications and considerations of these incidents paint a vivid picture of the thinking mechanisms and operations of those forces lording over the “liberated” areas—mechanisms that assume an almost identical methodology to that adopted by the Assad regime security organs and its security forces’ elements.
Without delving into the details of the recent arrests of the Kafranbel media activists, and what this tiny town represents for the values of the Syrian Revolution through its dissemination of the Syrian national voice to the entire world; and the role that Hadi al-Abdallah plays as a journalist accompanying the leaders of Jaish al-Fath—of which the NF is a key faction—notwithstanding; the silencing of Kafranbel’s voice, which has represented Syrians during the past five years, and to date, the remaining glimmer of hope remaining to us, portends the advent of days filled with silence for the Syrian media in the liberated interior in particular, as well as in the neighboring countries—especially Turkey—in general.
Many media activists, whether in the city of Gaziantep—where martyr Naji al-Jarf was assassinated—or other Turkish cities, have either changed their place of residence or began preparing to leave Turkish territory altogether. The threat now is real and serious, and is not known who will be responsible for the coming assassination or detention. All forces that do—or do not—consider themselves part of the Revolution fall into doubt and are under accusation. This will lead to a vast desiccation of the opposition media arena, with opinions and voices upon whom hopes to remain whatever is left of the Revolution—the freedom, the expression, the voice of the downtrodden and the oppressed—all but disappearing.
This desiccation will—in turn, much as it had driven many journalists in the four past decades of Assad’s rule—lead us to a change in the compass expressed by the Revolutionary media; whether in terms of substance or form. Much like the Assad Father and Son had their own media lickspittles and yes-men; so will al-Mhaisni and al-Jawlani have their own yes-men, and those sycophants echoing their positions on this media platform or the other.
The consequences of this restriction in media and expression freedom in the areas of opposition control and influence—whether in the liberated Syrian interior or in neighboring countries—will not be limited to the silencing the other voice. It will exceed that, to reach the silencing of the voice of the truth as well. The media, as is a well known fact, plays an essential role in the documentation of violations and daily practices that may often prove difficult for rights’ organizations and networks to document. This role will be the subject of prosecution and the following—by a great many armed factions— of numerous activists whose media and documentary roles converge.
The five years of continuous war, as well as its attendant byproduct of unprecedented Islamic extremism in the region—of which Daesh represents its peak—will not only pose a threat to the freedom of media and of speech. It too, much like the Assad regime, can ill accept the existence of any opposition, even in thought processes. To it, the other equals naught. To it, quashing the other’s voice with a gun silencer’s bullet, or via a band of masked men taking him into the dark pits of the unknown; would prove quite an easy task.
These incidents are not new within the greater narrative of the Syrian Revolution. This is not the first time that revolutionary activists are apprehended by factions or elements not necessarily affiliated to the Revolution, yet nonetheless influential in areas considered as liberated and “Revolutionary.” These were preceded by the abduction, in 2013, of the four activists of the Centre for the Documenting of Violations in the city of Douma; the arrest of activist Abu Maryam and his comrades in the Bustan al-Qasr neighborhood of Aleppo; as well as the numerous journalists disappeared by Daesh into its dungeons and torture chambers in the city of Raqqa.
All of these events prompt us to either revisit the term "liberated areas”—as the forces controlling them are far removed from the values of freedom called for by the Syrian people in the streets of Hama, Homs, Deraa, and Aleppo; or prompt us towards a comprehensive mobilization on the media and human rights level, to reject the practices of such powers, which differ very little from the Assad tyranny; save for the growing of beards and the trafficking in religion. Thus, media activity would not serve as a gateway to promote a new form of terrorism.
* Opinion pieces do not necessarily express the views of Rozana Media.