Reports | 25 05 2020
One may almost forget, whilst bearing witness to the implementation of the second part of the Zabadani-Fu’ah Agreement [what label!]; that Syrians have ever risen to achieve the political change they think, feel, or hope would hold a better life for themselves and their children. One may forget that And all Syrians ruled by the state wanted was a state of law in front of which all people would be equal; and wherein the interests of the powerful and the influential do not supersede the law. There had been injustice, tyranny, and domination which had its own public, on the one hand; versus a demand for law and justice which also had its own public, on the other. That was the prime equation of the conflict that erupted in the spring of 2011 in Syria. Yet, in the scenes of the Zabadani-Fu’ah Agreement implementation, no component of the Syrians’ aforementioned dream seems to be present at all.
Today, we witness the implementation of an agreement carrying the names of two towns separated by hundreds of kilometers [geographically], and between which there is neither a direct connection, nor any dispute to be settled by an agreement, to start with. The fact that the agreement involves the bizarre mention of ‘town-exchange’, whereby a Fu’ah resident would be transferred to Zabadani—and vice versa; that the negotiation process had been conducted between opposition fighters on the one side, and an Iranian delegation on the other; and, finally, that the agreement itself is guaranteed by the exalted United Nations, no less—all notwithstanding; the only thing uniting these two towns into one agreement, is the very thing that puts them apart—in the eyes of the agreement’s signatories: Their sectarian affiliation.
Dozens of wounded and ailing with their families exit [Shiite] Fu’ah to Turkey, are transported by air to Beirut, then by road to Damascus, which is under the [Alawite] regime’s control. In contrast, dozens of wounded and ailing are transported from [Sunni] Zabadani to Beirut by road, then flown to Turkey under the control of the [Sunni Turkish] Justice and Development party.
This agreement reveals the practically conclusion of the continuous effort to distort [the Revolution] during the years of the conflict. That is the effort to squeeze the Syrian conflict into a sectarian template, wholly divorced from the problematic of tyranny and freedom. According to this template, the conflict ostensibly is a sectarian conflict—clearly the understanding most common today among the two fighting parties and their public; a result of a purposeful media and cultural drive. Has been affiliated to the Syrian conflict, after faltering Syrian Revolution, in demarcated bad malate regional conflict, are demarcated Sunni-Shiite conflict. Following the foundering of the Syrian Revolution, the Syrian conflict has been thrust into an ill-fated regional conflict framework—namely the Shiite-Sunni conflict. The Syrian Revolution has not been able to overcome the enormous centripetal force this framework possesses. The two poles of the regional-sectarian conflict [Iran and Saudi Arabia] have become the spokespersons speak on behalf of the poles of the internal Syrian conflict [the regime and the Islamists].
While it is understandable that the struggle against political despotism opens up to a liberal prospect, via the consecration of mechanisms to restrain the infringement by authorities on the fundamental rights of the citizen; let us, for a moment, hypothetically accept the common belief that this is a sectarian conflict. One may, then, ask: Onto which prospect would a sectarian conflict open up? Or, rather, is there any prospect for such a conflict?
There are three "prospects" for a sectarian conflict. First is that of sectarian predominance—that is, of one sect overcoming the other, and subjecting it to its control. This is a prospect under which injustice remain intact, of course. Second is the prospect of genocide—that is, of one sect being able to uproot or exterminate the other sect/sects within its territory—such as happened to the Armenians under Muslim control in Turkey at the turn of the twentieth century; or, as happened in Mosul to the Yazidi community at the hands of Daesh. Third is bot prospects proving impossible—thereby leading to a perpetuated state of conflict, with all the attendant perennial death and destruction. It is clear that these are actually pitfalls—not prospects.
The various stakeholders continue their efforts to distort the nature of the conflict—so as to avoid political change that promises it with ostracism, accountability, or reduction of privileges, etc... That is understandable. But what is the power that drives the poor and the oppressed here and there to die, defending options that do not offer them any good? Realizing this required no further reflection. For were any of those defending the regime to take a look around them, they would find the regime’s authorities pursue policies of discrimination, intimidation, and corruption. It would be a natural conclusion that the regime does not constitute a solution to end the misery of those defending it. On the other hand, were those affiliated with the armed Islamist formations to take a look around them, they would also find that the Islamists’ authority is no less discriminatory, arbitrary, and far-removed from the standards of modernity and the humanity’s achievements; and that their control will only mean to farther drown in an abyss of tyranny and backwardness.
* Opinion pieces do not necessarily express the views of Rozana Media.