Al-Nusra Front, Opposition, and the Terrorist Lists

Al-Nusra Front, Opposition, and the Terrorist Lists

Reports | 25 05 2020

Al-Nusra Front [NF] has confronted all invitations urging it to step out of al-Qaeda’s mantle, with either silence or rejection. The opposition's attempts to do so have been incessant; there have been attempts by Michel Kilo, George Sabra, Mouaz al-Khatib—and less than two weeks ago—Khaled Khoja; as well as many others. With such efforts, they have offended the popular Revolution, and denied it any modicum of international sympathy towards it. There has been a great deal of rhetoric hubbub trying to establish a differentiation between them and Daesh—most of which stems from the assumption that NF is a Syrian organization; one that may transform itself from jihadism to Syrian nationalism. All of these attempts ended in failure. It is what was the opposition ought to have understood much earlier, from merely reading the jihadist organizations. Al-Qaeda is a pure intelligence production, one that is charged with the function of filling the gaping vacuum produced by the absence of historical alternatives to progress. Its creation also prevented the appearance—or the formation—of a national project in the countries involved in the crisis. That was the situation in Afghanistan, then in Iraq, then Yemen; and now in Syria, and others beyond as well. Of course these organizations appear as an expression of deep-seated crisis in a country—that is, they are the very embodiment of devastation, destruction, and arrested development.

NF and—not far removed—Daesh, have persistently refused to engage in any formations not under their leadership. That is true of the Ghuta, in the Qalamoun, and all “liberated" areas. They entered in the Jaish al-Fath [Army of Conquest] only because they had a leading position therein. The divergences between NF and Daesh—in terms of practices, or ideological roots—are insignificant. Any such differences in these issues, or in the organizational structure are not a differentiation or schismatic factor, that may allow one to label the NF as a ‘national’ movement, that recognizes others.

The NF have imposed a totalitarian form of authority in all the areas in which they have been able to prevail—and has fought wars to this end. It sought truce only in those areas in which did not enjoy absolute control; as well as practiced hypocrisy with more powerful factions to secure its expansion. It has, thus, taken advantage of the simple religious consciousness of most Syrians; while itself being a well-organized, rather sophisticated—in terms of planning and discipline—jihadist organization. It is funded by the al-Qaeda mother organization and by other jihadists; it enjoys a special relationship with the State of Qatar, which spares none of its gas and oil dollars—thus imposing an influence in many areas in the world. Qatar has mainly relied on the Muslim Brotherhood, and the NF in Syria; among others.

Now that the Revolution has been sullied and distorted by a plethora of sectarianism and jihadism; Syria has been destroyed because of the regime’s disastrous security/military option, and by external interventions; that jihadists have now struck in several countries—and may even flare up in countries surrounding Syria; the end hour must have finally arrived. A semblance of international and regional guardianship needs to be imposed on “us”—i.e. on the Revolution; its should be made into a lesson for the peoples of the world: Every revolution will turn into a sectarian one; sectarianism, fundamentalism, intolerance, murder, destruction, and war awaits the country [in which such revolution may erupt]. In such an atmosphere Jordan, in coordination with many other countries, is attempting to classify terrorist organizations in Syria. The most problematic faction precisely remains the NF. Many of the Syrian opposition failed to appreciate that patriotism has no truck with jihadism and, as such, they persist in their aforementioned repeated overtures towards the NF.

Jordan, as well as many other countries, fully comprehend that the NF are nothing more than a jihadist organization, and that they will eventually increasingly veer closer towards the type of practices that Daesh adopts, in the future. At any rate, the NF’s practices are both nihilistic and takfirist [expiatory] towards all other Syrians—whether Sunnis, or otherwise. The NF aims to impose its own totalitarian authority and judiciary as well as, eventually, its own Caliphate. The NF will inevitably join the terrorist fold, as will any other organization—whether large or small—whose starting point of understanding politics, other states and nations, political foes, and of life in general; does not stem from a sense of [Syrian] nationalism.

Saudi Arabia is currently hard at work to reunite the Syrian opposition, and to draft a joint political document on the future of Syria. And while all stakeholders are reminded of the Saudi role in the Lebanese Taif Accords; there is growing fear that it is actively working towards a Syrian Taif Accord. This apprehension derives from a global sectarian outlook for Syria. Russia, the U.S., Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar—all of these countries see the Syrian issue as nothing more than a sectarian issue. This is a very real problem.

This observation intends to state that the Syrian opposition should reject any and all political project predicated upon sectarianism; but rather commence from a nationalist base. The presence of the Army of Islam, the Ahrar al-Sham movement, and the Muslim Brotherhood will increase pressure towards a sectarian vision; since all these forces see Syrians as no more than a conglomeration of sects—not as a people with equal rights, whose future constitution must be predicated upon the principle of citizenship and human rights. These forces are supports by liberal forces of an equally sectarian perspective vis-a-vis the Syrian people. What will result from the Riyadh conference of the Syrian opposition—regarding the formation of a negotiating delegation with the regime—must be accompanied with the formation of a national council, that closely monitors all possible pitfalls into sectarianism of any potential negotiations with the Syrian regime, or with those states supporting the transition process.

The NF will—as well as Daesh—definitely be in the crosshairs of any coming military operations, as well as possibly other small organizations here and there. No concessions are to be made to the forces of sectarianism, that will only help secure the appearance of alternative jihadist organizations.

Finally, the Syrian environment is not an incubator for jihadist groups, which have been forcefully planted into Syrian territory. There presently is a political process, one which forms a critical moment in Syria’s evolution. Our problem is that the international and regional intervention [in Syrian affairs] is both quite extensive, and of a sectarian basis. I mean to say that it is incumbent upon Syrians to fully comprehend the seriousness of the current political outcomes. If the current political toying with the sectarian issue persists; eliminating it in the future will not be a simple issue. It may, rather, herald the inception of sabotaging the social fabric, and sectarianize religion.

* Opinion pieces do not necessarily express the views of Rozana Media.

 

We use cookies to give you the best possible experience on our website.

Accept Reject

We use cookies to give you the best possible experience on our website.

Accept Reject