Reports | 25 05 2020
By: Hanadi Zahlout
The question has been asked once again by the Syrian Revolution’s public, in a variety of formulations—sectarian, political and social—particularly following the [predominantly southern-Beirut Shiite suburb of] Burj al-Barajneh bombing, in which they saw Hezbollah drink the same bitter cup they had been drinking since 2011. And while some did condemn this “schadenfreude," finding the same hand behind all terrorism, as well as identifying all victims as being victims of the regime; the question was asked again: Why was there no Revolution in the coastal areas?
Inasmuch as this question represents a simplification of the Syrian issue; therein also lies the answer—in the understanding of the inherent contradictions the regime managed to admix and manipulate. We, therefore, come to this reality today of a conflict whose image is sectarian in utter contradiction to its actual reality.
Whereas the Alawite sect felt injustice and exclusion for hundreds of years; Hafez al-Assad wanted to portray his coming to power in Syria as a triumph of the sect itself. He presented this to his followers in the sect as if the reins of authority had fallen into their hands; although in reality, the first to be eradicated were officers who were his comrades in arms and co-religionists—Ibrahim Makhus, Mohammad Omran, and Salah Jadid—who were either exiled, murdered, or imprisoned!
Lurking behind the scenes were Damascene and Aleppan traders—the true supporters assisting Hafez al-Assad in the consolidation of his dictatorship. We were exposed to phrases such as "We have asked God for assistance—so He sent us Hafez al-Assad!” or “[Rule] forever, O Hafez al-Assad!” These were statements that originated from the very heart of the capital and other major cities. Many were those who took to the [mosques’] pulpits, glorifying and heaping praise onto the new president; thereby crystallizing the alliance between power, religion, and capital.
Since the moment he assumed power, the policy of militarizing the coastal countryside began in earnest. The number of officers from this area increased dramatically, and joining the army or security branches became the dream of young men in these areas—a dream further titillated by a new class of religious men on the ascendant with the [ruling] family; harping on the notion of protracted historical persecution.
No sooner did the budding union revolt and the movement of general strikes in Damascus and Aleppo start to make a showing in the late 1970s, that it was crushed by Hafez Assad's iron grip. He established the so-called Saraya al-Difa’ [Defense Brigades] led by his brother Rifaat al-Assad, which embarked on and sectarian practices that were used to consolidate power, crush opponents, and bend Syrian society in front of the dictator. He quickly then placed his own brother in exile, and sat atop the throne of a country whose most famous landmarks became its bloody prisons—Saidnaya, to Tadmur, to the military Mazzeh prison. Among the inmates of these prisons were thousands from the Lattakia and Tartous countrysides. A policy of austerity was forced upon people, who were asked to starve for a homeland that was facing endless—and unending—plots!
In the 1990s, the unholy alliance between the [Assad] family and clergy of all denominations rose further, and they imposed their authority over the cities with the an algae-like bourgeoisie which floated on the surface; whose sole objective was swift monetary gain; and which failed to establish a single national economic project.
The theatrical—and spurious—transfer of power from father to son, performed at lightning speed, did give rise to some dreams that were soon to evaporate rather quickly. Disposable catchphrases were generated for domestic consumption, such as “the president is transparent, but those around him are corrupt.” Authority’s policies changed not one iota: The family’s ‘money-men” rose further and further; and the practices of the President’s relatives became increasingly crass and rude—those practices directed against the Lattakia countryside since the 1980s, and more present today in the very home turf of the Assads, the headquarters of the ruling family!
That is why the Syrian Revolution was no more than an expression of the uprising of the marginalized countryside—the Sunni countryside, to be more specific. This countryside to whom it was portrayed that it had been the Alawite countryside that was its persecutor!
One can not disclaim the responsibility of the Syrian coastal countryside, the Alawite countryside in particular, in being less than forthcoming in recognizing the validity of the demands for reform advocated by the Revolution during its peaceful stage. That is especially salient, as these Alawites experienced oppression and corruption more than others at the hands of the current ruling class; they more than anyone know that this had always been a class—not sectarian—conflict; and that sectarianism was but a facade to conceal their own exploitation.
Five years into the Revolution that has become armed; hijacked by the corrupt and the extremist; in which the Free Syrian Army [FSA] was fought by all and sundry—whether locally or internationally; wherein the coastal countryside residents wholly subscribed to the "terrorists" theory; whereas the residents of the interior subscribed to the “sectarian regime” theory. Roads were severed and completely booby-trapped between the people of the formerly unified country!
Finding a national all-inclusive solution is, in my belief, is becoming increasingly difficult and distant—despite the fact that the interest of all sects in Syria lies therein!
Opinion articles published do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Rozana.