Reports | 25 05 2020
By: Tariq Azizeh
News of the direct Russian military intervention in Syria dominates over all the other snowballing information the Syrian slaughter seems to generate every day. It seemed as if it became the prime event of the war that has been ongoing for years now; while, in reality, being no different in its filth and its adverse repercussions on both Syrians and the future of their country, than that the roles of the other parties involved in the Syrian tragedy, in various capacities and at different levels.
The Russians’ blatant intervention in such manner—despite its importance, and irrespective of one’s position towards it—is neither surprising nor strange. It is the culmination of the policy pursued by Moscow vis-a-vis the "Syrian file" since the outbreak of the revolt against the Assad regime in 2011. Russia has consistently supported the regime in international forums; did not hesitate to use the right of veto at the UN Security Council to prevent issuance of resolutions against it—even if only to condemn its crimes committed against the people; and has persisted in supplying it with materiel, weapons, and advisers. When all this was no longer enough, Russia found no alternative to escalating its intervention and directly involving its own armed forces in the Syrian War.
Furthermore, this development seems "logical" from the historical point of view, if perceived from the perspective of the general weight of the Russian presence in the region—and Syria in particular; as well as the vitality of Russia's strategic interests therein, interests dating back to the days of the Tsars and their meticulous quest to reach ‘warm waters.’
Historical records and history books tell us that Tsarist Russia sent its warships to Syrian shores for the first time in the eighteenth century [1772]. It deployed its troops there to protect its interests and support its allies in the face of its historical rival, the Ottoman Empire. Russian consular activity in Syria dates back to the first third of the nineteenth. The first Russian consulate was established in Jaffa [1820], followed by active consulates in Aleppo, Latakia, Beirut, and Sidon. Russia, like other major European powers, received privileges and reinforced its position in the territory of the Ottoman Empire, using the “minority protection” card—a slogan still invoked nowadays.
Russian interest in Syria continued during the Soviet era. As a reminder, the first time the right of veto was put to use in the UN Security Council, was by Soviet delegate Vishinski, on February 16, 1946, when discussing the Council's draft resolution on the withdrawal of French troops from Syria. The then Soviet delegate objected to the project submitted by the United States, because it contained the phrase "withdrawal as soon as possible;” with Vishinski insisting that the wording be “withdraw immediately.” He actually succeeded in doing so, forcing the French to withdraw immediately, thereby also demonstrating the centrality of Syria's position and its importance in Soviet foreign policy. Soviet Russia also strove, during its protracted conflict with the West, to strengthen its influence in the Middle East, specifically Syria. It was one of the main arenas of the Cold War, from the 1950s. The Arab-Israeli conflict formed a key factor in the significant Soviet role in the region.
The same can be said of the Russian Federation era. Despite a declining in the global balance of power following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has retained a huge part of the Soviet legacy; starting from its permanent membership of the Security Council, not ending of its proper spheres of influence and imperialist tendencies backed by a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons. Within a quarter century following the resounding fall of the Soviet Union, Russia was able to emerge out of its isolation and rearrange its cards, making a strong comeback to the international stage—amicably at times, raising problems at others.
In light of field developments on the ground leading up to direct military intervention, the Russians have become well aware that the successive fractures and defeats the regime—Moscow’s “ally" in Syria—had suffered, would lead to the loss of their most important area of influence in the Middle East; the one spot insuring them their only foothold on the Mediterranean Sea. They seems ready to keep it at all costs, especially after the harsh blow that hit their interests in the western Mediterranean, losing their Tripoli as a result of having been deceived by NATO in Libya; when the international resolution to protect Libyan civilians from the brutality of Gaddafi was shifted to become a pretext for military intervention and the imposition of Western hegemony.
In any case, Russia did not embark on its step unilaterally. The subsequent arrangements for the coordination of air operations in Syrian airspace between itself and the anti-ISIS US-led alliance airforce; is but discussions of details, after the substance had been agreed upon. Perhaps herein precisely lies the novelty implicit in the Russian military intervention: It represented a shift from the stage of strategic conflict between the United States and Russia, to a kind of strategic coordination, so to speak, through the Syrian gate, under the guise of the "war on terror.”
Opinion articles published do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Rozana.