Reports | 25 05 2020
Sectarian understanding throws society back to its members' religious identities; thereby turning a single community into communities, and a single people into peoples. Writing on the sectarian issue in Syria draws its terms of reference from the Lebanese example; yet whereas Lebanon is doomed to be ruled under a sectarian system, in order to obfuscate the wasting away of its bourgeoisie and its inability to emulate its European counterparts, copying that model in the Syrian case is uniquely based on illusion. This writing takes understanding of the issues into an area of oversimplification and prosaicness—that is, defining individuals solely on the religions of their families into which they are born; while completely disregarding the structure of society as well as the nature of governance as. This is one of the characteristics of sectarianism.
Thinker Sadiq Jalal al-Azm attempted to found an interpretation of the Syrian regime's nature, on the basis of the absolute violence with which it faced a popular revolution; his thought guided him to the concept of "political Alawism." In his opinion, without its presence the regime would have collapsed. Yet, rather than merely confining this concept of his to the political realm, he concurs with the journalist questioning him in an interview, extending this concept to the economic, security, social and other arenas; thereby blithely ignoring the vast alliances between authorities and the Syrian bourgeoisie, the commercial, industrial and other classes. He lumps all members of the Alawite sect into it. The only benefit of his distinction between political Alawism and the Alawite sect itself is toclarify the existence of a ruling and oppressed sects; and that the influential Alawites should be eliminated, not the entire sect.
Such an interpretation falls in the pits of sectarianism. An easy question would be: where is the Alawite party? Where, indeed, is the Alawite political project in the regime's practices? For, is not this system—at the political, economic, security, and social levels of expression—a type of a class-less form of control; one that has evolved and became integrated with the conditions of globalization, the revolution against which was in turn a revolution against its liberalist policies? The presence of specific groups in the system belonging to the Alawite sect—particularly in the security and military apparatuses—and the seizure of the most important junctures of the economy, has not excluded the heavy representation of the other communities in these apparatuses, as well as in all levels of the regime. Such an interpretation, therefore, defies the reality of the situation. It merely wishes to squeeze reality into a concept flirting with people's emotions and base instincts; while not offering any explanation for the nature of the regime, or its ability to weather the People's Revolution.
The sectarian system in Lebanon is an integral system—Lebanon itself was based upon it to consecrate the rule of its bourgeoisie. Such an interpretation would not be correct in Syria, however; sectarianism, therefore, now finds parties theorizing in its favor—albeit with an unbearable flippance. Had such been committed at the hands of sectarianists, it would have been understandable as they base it on an atavistic understanding of society; the problem lies in a personality of Al-Azm's stature theorizing in such vain. It is, without doubt, a fall into a sectarian understanding, and the establishment of politics on the basis of religion. When al-Azm talks about the end of the current conflagration, he says that it would be almost similar to the situation in Lebanon under the Taif Agreement—i.e. a sectarian solution par excellence. This is where his distinction between a "political Alawism" and the Alawite sect, as well as his remarks about the political similarity with political Maronism comes into play.
The concept of the 'Alawite' or 'Nusairi' regime, has become an oft repeated moniker among both the liberal and Islamist opposition, under the pretext of remaining true to reality, as well as taking one's head out of the sand and in order to avoid the worst. But being put forward by an intellectual such as al-Azm, only serves to compound the complexity of the Revolution's problems; precipitate it into a broadening of sectarianization; and does not provide an explanation for the ascendance of the sectarian problems that appear in the conflict between the people and the regime.
Sectarian rhetoric in the Revolution is rife in the milieu of the aforementioned opposition and the jihadists. The regime, from its own side, attempts to separate the jihadists from the rest of the people; it emphasizes time and again that it faces a global conspiracy comprising gangs of Salafists, the Muslim Brotherhood, and extremist groups. It promotes sectarian practices intended to incite people's sectarian instincts—not least of which is its role in the release of jihadists, and pushing them to form their own hardline jihadist organizations; and perhaps maybe even a larger role. This tendency is intended to besiege and stifle the national tendency within the Revolution; whilst taking the military and security option to its very extreme end—thereby firmly closing the way for a political solution.
In his interview with DW-Arab, al-Azm stokes the sectarian fires. He does not speak about the present moment, but rather speaks of the regime in essentialist terms. He does not speak about the current conflict requiring specific issues—very much as does the regime, in its effort to save itself; but speaks for the future, foreseeing that it would necessarily be in a vain similiar to the Lebanese Taif Agreement, or in a similar formula. Herein al-Azm's liberalism completely collapses. For a long time now, the man no longer is a leftist—particularly when he proclaimed that globalization would harmoinze itself to the world and its evolution, and that it actually represents a leap in global development; while ignoring that it actually is a new capitalist phase, aiming to further continue the loot under the guises of a 'new world order' and in the name of diverse scientific revolutions.
Al-Azm was—and remains—a sort of 'rabble-rousing' intellectual. But his latest 'rabble-rousing' with regard to "political Alawism," and its purported offshoots, seats him at the same table with his old friend Adonis—albeit in his opposite direction. For the latter defends "political Alawism" under the pretext of needing to changing culture and society, then changing authority; namely, calling to "leave power unchecked, as it will fall" as soon as the aforementioned change occurs. Al-Azm, from his side—under the pretext of a critique of "political Alawism"—actually defends sectarianism and all of its derivatives.
* Opinion articles do not necessarily reflect the opinons of Rozana.