Reports | 25 05 2020
Given the predominance of criminal sectarian violence carried out by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant [ISIL] from the Sunni side, and Shi'ite militias and parties from the Shiite side; analysis abounds regarding the importance and role of religious reform with a categorical—and largely true—assertion that this [Arab] Spring will not reach its happy concusion without a religious revolution (against the inherited irrational tradition) that shakes the very foundation on which political tyranny is predicated.
Any observer of this discourse however which, while ostensibly correct is fundamentally flawed, can easily grasp that most criticism here is levelled firstly to the Sunni, then Shiite, religious heritage—but not to the religious heritage of minorities. The proponents of this view base it on the hollow argument that reforming the religion of the majority will automatically prompt fearful minorities—who possess inherent "secular tendencies," according to some advocates of this view—to renege on their religious heritage, and immediately leap into a modern citizenship state!
Such view usually emanates from "secular" circles which assume that the gravest danger can be found in the tyranny of the religion of the majority. Hence, to them, it would be enough to reform it, for the minorities to find themselves engaged in citizenship; as they would authomatically cease to consider themselves as minorities! But, what about minorities' perception of themselves as minorities? What about their religious tradition that helps numb their adherents, and keeps them in a parochial circle of "sectarian minority" instead of the wider circle of citizenship; and that views the religious other as a distrusftul satanic entity?
The aforementioned view presumes that religious reform would aim to determine the relationship of religion with state and politics at one level; thus prompting the majority to consider minorities as citizens at a second level—while competely disregarding its role in moving people from mere subjects to becoming individuals, free citizens. Religious reform, therefore, first targets members of society who consider themselves "subjects" in order that they start perceiving themselves as individuals; to help them break the barriers of social group and move towards a society comprised of free individuals.
The absence of this aspect in any talk of religious reform in the Arab world, is the reason behind the need for religious reform of minorities being largely overlooked. Religious reform is, thus, limited to the two major Islamic religious majorities (Shia and Sunni) and, thereby, being faced with yet another variant of the "minorities' protection" argument. Accpording to this argument, society is vertically divided into a majority, who is obligated to reform its religion so as to protect minorities—whose beliefs and texts are no less rigid, closed, ossified, fanatical, or expiatory of the "other." That is not to deny the positive spiritual aspect to be found in all religions, of course; that positive aspect which religious reform generally aims to liberate from the influence of irrationality.
The practices—predicated to a minoritarian sectarian dimension—of authoritarian states (such as Syria and Iraq, for example) without necessarily being sectarian in and of themselves; would not have been able to produce such lethal criminality, if they had not based themselves on a readily-available legacy of religious minorities, with all its loathsome aspects, to endorse it and turn it into an ideological rallying point against the "other" these authorities are combating. The fear of minorities that justify backing existing authorities to protect themselves from the "other" is—in one of its aspects—an intense expression of the minority's view of itself as a religious minority rather than citizens. This would not be, were it not for a religious heritage that has not been subject to the scrutinizing scalpel of self-criticism; and which is no less negative in its view of the majority, as that perceived majority view of itself. Religious reform will, therefore, remain truncated and its results irrelevant if it fails to encompass all religions, sects, and creeds; in order to exorcize them from the magical and the absurd.
There is yet another evil magic spell hovering over the Arab mindset in this area. Criticism is often focused on the religious Sunni and Shiite heritages as being the culprits in stifling the process of reform. Calls focus on the clergy and adherents of these religions to take bold steps towards the desired reform. It is worth noting in this vain, that there numerous reform attempts have been made in this context: Attempts started by Mohammed Abdo and [Jamal al-Din] al-Afghani, and not ending with Sayyid Qumni, Nasr Hamed Abu Zeid, Mohammad Shahrour, and Hassan Hanafi on the Sunni side; and those by Ahmad Qabbanji, Ahmed al-Kateb, Mohammad Hussein Naiana, Ali Shariati—who famously said: To truly comprehend religion, one must follow the path of the anti-religious—, Mehdi Bazargan, Karim Soroush, et al. on the Shiite level. On the other hand, one cannot find a single reformist minority voice—whether in sects (Alawite, Druze, Ismaili,...) or religions (Levantine Christianity)—or even a call to reform. What is most paradoxical, is that many minority "intellectuals" are among the most vociferous voices calling for the reform of the majority's religious traditions; all the while not daring to apply the same criticism or call to reform to his or her own sect's religious tradition!
* Opinion articles reflect the views of their authors, and do not necessarily those of Rozana.