Reports | 25 05 2020
Political Islam, in its many transmutations and variants, has taken advantage of ISIS' limitless barbarity to present itself as the alternative leadership of the Syrian Revolution. The regime has also done the same, aiming to paint the people's Revolution as being an Islamic Revolution, actively pushing it to actually become one. This Political Islam has neither denied the "Islamic" nature of ISIS, nor criticized it for being opposed to the values of this day and age, the needs of the people, or the objectives of the Revolution—namely creating a system of human rights, resolving socio-economic problems, and transition towards democracy. It has, rather, been critical of ISIS on the basis of its faulted Khilafa [Islamic Rule] and improper Sharia [Islamic Law] credentials. In the absence of such critique, ISIS are not only considered heretics and apostates, in contradiction to each and every basic tenet of human life; but also abjectly inacapable of achieving the objectives of the popular Revolution aimed at a better life for all people. Political Islam has neither made a break with the idea of Khilafa, or with its Sharia-based Hudood [Punishments] such as stoning, captivity, or beheadings; nor does it actually consider them barbaric practices. Political Islam's only contention therewith stems from these Hudood not being applied in accordance with the purported Sharia limitations—which remain, to date, unavailable. Perhaps when these limits do become available, these Hudood will be applied according to the Sharia, then.
This became most apparent the widespread debate following the death by stoning of a woman accused of adultery, in Hama. The aforementioned variations of Political Islam quickly jumped on this incident to present themselves as an alternative. As this Islam is lacking in vision and in a coherent program; it resorts, as is usual, to quickly try and use certain incidents to promote itself, instead of putting these issues up for debate. The same was repeated when the words written by Ms. Lama Atassi were misconstrued as an attack on the Prophet Muhammad and his companion Khaled Ibn Al-Walid.
The uprisings or revolutions engulfing most Arab countries after 2011, the failure of the national and socialist projects, and the link in most peoples' minds between the liberal project and gangster-economics and poverty; all have given Political Islam room to promote itself as an alternative. Its elimination from power in what has all the semblances of a military coup in Egypt, also armed it with a new injustice allowing it to paint itself as a party simply "not allowed to rule." In Tunisia, it presented itself as a party respecting democracy, especially after approval of the constitution and the parliamentary elections, and its congratulation to the Nida [Appeal] for winning the elections. In other Arab countries, such as Libya, Syria, and Yemen, it acts via organizations involved in the dissemination of "civil war." Leaving generalizations aside, however, the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia continued the very same policies of subjugation economics and the impoverishment of the people, while politically seeking to "Ikhawnize" the State—especially in Egypt. Its experience in Sudan was disastrous to freedoms, and led to increased impoverishment and sectarianism; as in Algeria, where Islamists minced no words about setting up the gallows for secularists. Political Islam, therefore, constitutes neither a political nor an economic alternative; it merely takes advantage of people's basic religious awareness to promote its political presence; and through enforcement of conservative, atavistic, inherited social and religious values, maintains its control and prevails.
The only strength of this Political Islamic trend lies in the weakness of the aforementioned other projects. In truth, it is an economic partner of the liberal project, while disagreeing with it politically; Political Islam's economic concept is that of the liberal project itself. Hence, Islamists in both Egypt and Tunisia rushed to call for help from the World Bank to raise funds to solve their economic problems.
The current strength of the Salafi Jihadists, their largely-unobstructed expansion in Syria and Iraq, the horror of the people therefrom, added to the complete absence of a local or global strategy to end the general problems these communities face; are what will allow political Islam to continue to exist. Salafi Jihadism, after the development of its ISIS strand, has now come to form a new strategy which will allow continued American hegemony over the Arab region and its surroundings. The current international coalition is but an expression of this hegemony, and this is what gives political Islam a slim opportunity to achieve power. Its existence, however, can be no more than cooperation with other political forces, but without beaing able to form its own system of government; the Saudi kingdom rejects such outcome, as well as most of the Arab political and financial powers—perhaps the exception of Qatar, and it too will inevitably adjust its position. That leaves Turkey, which is employing Political Islam to stretch its tentalces in the region, out of Syria; which means that political Islam will remain a force in the political arena, but will not allowed to form a political system on its own. It has failed in Egypt and Tunisia, and in Sudan before; its participation in the Iraqi government diminshed its role into that of yet another sectarian group; whereas in Libya it is a force of destruction and sabotage, and so on and so forth.
What is mentioned here reflects Political Islam's limited role in solving problems; if not its role in actually creating them. Examples are in Egypt, where it promoted the intensification of political problems, or in Syria, where it played a terrible role vis-à-vis the Revolution by pushing it to Islamize and, thus, being in tandem with the regime's interests, and allowing the emergence of jihadism. It has the star role in creating problems in all Arab countries.
This Islam, therefore, is not a substitute for jihad. Its concept of the civil state is that of the Islamic State itself. Its hostility towards secularism in general, particularly politically, clearly demonstrates its sectarianism, fundamentalism, and inability to adapt to the precepts of secularism, human rights and proper citizenship. It also demonstrates how the concepts of the Khilafa and Hudood—which run contrary to all acceptable modern values—still are very much part and parcel of its project. Its refusal of their application, is merely based on what it views as the non-completion of their Sharia legal requirements, of course, as it alone sees and understands them!
* Opinion articles do not necessarily reflect the views of Rozana