By: Mohammed Dibo
Anyone taking a deep look into the international, regional, and local reactions to the international campaign against ISIS and its efficiency, can clearly discern holes in its strategy—holes so dangerous, that they beg the question: Does it really aim to fight ISIS? Or is there another agenda?
Ostensibly, ISIS represents the "enemy" of all those who want to fight it. Yet in reality, and judging by happenings on the ground, it seems that no one wants to fight this war—at least, not if it does not directly serve their own objectives; which may include creating spaces allowing ISIS to extend, in the hopes of te war against it favouring this or that party's interests. Which leads us to the most serious question about the role of these forces in ISIS' "creation" and supporting it to become a helpful tool to achieve their aspirations, based on the strategy of creating, then inflating the enemy.
ISIS gave Washington the opportunity to open Iraq's doors wide and return under international sanction. It allowed Washington to intervene in Syria despite the regime, as well as Moscow and Iran both of whom were opposed to any direct US intervention, and rejecting their involvement in the war. It is to be noted that Washington was working on a long-term plan to achieve its and its partners' interests in the region, at the expense of the Russo-Iranian alliance, which has now started to falter after initial progress. John Kerry's latest declaration that "Kobanî" is of no true strategic importance, represents nothing less than acceding to the aims of the Turkish ally's aim in destroying all what the [Kurdish] Democratic Union Party achieved on the ground; as well as weakening Ocallanism [in reference to Abdullah Ocallan, the Kurdish PKK Rebel leader, imprisoned for life in Turkey], and allowing Baraznism [in reference to Masud Barzani, head of Iraqi Kurdistan] to fill in this void. Allowing entry of the Peshmerga [Iraqi Kurdish Fighters] confirms such intention, thus allowing ISIS progress enough to achieve this goal; then to have war waged upon it later. This is the same strategy the Syrian regime embarked upon, by providing an atmosphere amenable to ISIS' expansion, thereby serving as its tool in combatting the military forces rising against the regime, on the one hand; and to convince the world that what is happening in Syria falls under the moniker of "terrorism," thus legitimizing the regime as an indispensable ally in fighting against it. The regime's efforts were quickly disappointed by discounting its, and its allies', involvement; therefore, promting them to label the war against ISIS as futile, after they spent three years trupmeting it as a terrorist threat!
Turkey did play awhether direct, or indirect—role in supporting ISIS, so as to become its tool in liquidating the Kurdish presence in northern Syria; in an effort to de-clutch the PKK before entering into a final settlement with it; as well as achieving the long-sought buffer zone in northern Syria, thereby easing the burden of Syrian refugees, as well as granting Turkey the final in that area. Turkey will, therefore, continue to block any fight against ISIS until its goals are achieved.
The strategy of the Gulf states, for whom the Arab Spring was extremely confounding, has essentially been based upon the prevention of the Arab Spring from spreading toward the Gulf. Introducing extremism, terrorism and fervent destruction into the Arab Spring serves as a bulwark against their own people who would, thus, prefer security over drowning in the swamp of a Civil War. Not to mention the role Syrian territory has served, as an end-destination of terrorists' export. This way, these states "dumped" the burden of their own terrorists onto Syrian soil; then, ISIS having achieved their goals, entering into war against it.
The main interest of Iran, and Moscow behind it, was to bring "anti-terrorism" to the fore, at the expense of regime change in Syria. They, thus, oversaw the expansion process of terrorism in Syria from start to finish; meaning that their interests coincided with those of their rivals at points, as expounded above. This is summed up by attempting to rsist the US drive to paint the Syrian regime as "a partner in terrorism"—an effort overturned by Washington, by single-handedly spearheding the war on terrorism, perhaps until the maturity of a regional settlement. Behind the guise of this war, each party is working to improve the ground conditions in their own favor; with ISIS, thereby, becoming the enemy simultaneously supported and fought by everyone! Since, had it not been for the aforementioned gaps ISIS would not have grown so rapidly. It will equally rapidly shrink, once a settlement has matured, and the gaps have been closed. This, however, does not mean that ISIS is merely a puppet, manufactured and managed in an intelligence game as some parties in the region parrot; ISIS is also a product of societies i deep crisis at all levels—politically , economically and socially. The erosion of traditional Arab repressive authoritarian regimes, has only given it room to grow and expand.
* Opinion articles do not necessarily reflect the opinions of Radio Rozana.